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Carrying a German Flame: the Olympic Torch  
Relay and its Instrumentalization in the Age of  
Ostpolitik 
Christopher Young ∗ 
Abstract: Sport was immensely important to the GDR be-
cause of its potential to symbolize ideological superiority. 
Prior as well as during the Olympic Games at Munich in 
1972, the GDR tried in different ways to beat its hated 
West-German counterpart. Winning more medals than the 
FRG was one thing, but at the same time East Germany 
tried to obstruct the games in several propagandistic ways. 
The article centers on the GDR’s failure to sabotage the 
planned route of the traditional torch relay through Eastern 
Europe.  
1. Introduction 
In the German cold-war experience, sport was anything but normal.1 In the 
1960s, as the world leant gently towards détente and gradually learnt to live 
with the post-war status quo, German-German attitudes crystallized out into an 
intractable and ever irascible stalemate. For Bonn and East Berlin, sport pro-
vided front-line action in a general political order that had become increasingly 
wary of real confrontation. Thus, from the late 1950s, the Americans and Sovi-
ets could revel in the televised hype of an annual track and field meet that 
pitted the prowess and potential of one system against each other within the 
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College, Trumpington Street, CAMBRIDGE CB2 1RF, Great Britain; 
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 Author’s note: I would like to thank Lorenz Peiffer (Hannover) and Kay Schiller (Durham) 
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1  This essay, which sticks to a narrative of high political intrigue, will go no way towards 
following up Mary Fulbrook’s (2005) recent admirable attempt to examine the normality of 
life within the GDR’s ‘participatory dictatorship’. 
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safety of an athletic arena.2 Macroscopically, sport served as a surrogate realm 
for the playing out, and even celebration of ideological tensions. Microscopi-
cally, by contrast, when it came to German-German relations, sport had a much 
harder edge. The number of free-standing cross-border contests dwindled to a 
trickle after the erection of the Berlin Wall, and these were matched, virtually, 
in the mid 1960s by the enforced play-offs for places in the united German 
team imposed on both countries by IOC regulations.3 German-German sporting 
contests were played for high stakes in a game of elimination and prestige on 
the international stage. 
International sport was immensely important to the GDR not just because of 
its potential to symbolize ideological superiority but also due to its implicit and 
jealously guarded principle of universality.4 Operating via non-governmental 
organizations which enjoyed growing autonomy from superpower interference 
and an increasing sense of their own importance across the 1960s, sport pro-
vided the GDR with the opportunity to stage its own acceptance in international 
networks, a process otherwise ruthlessly stymied by the Federal Republic in 
almost every other realm. By definition, then, Bonn was as interested in sport 
and its quirky international rules of engagement as East Berlin. The IOC’s 
decision to permit a separate East German team to compete at the 1968 Mexico 
Olympics and, then, to grant the GDR a fully sovereign team at the 1972 
Games in Munich ushered one round of sporting attrition towards its conclu-
sion. On the surface, this resolution to a decade and a half’s wrangling over 
recognition should have harmonized seamlessly with the SPD’s election vic-
tory in 1969 and Brandt’s new policies towards the East. Instead, the latter 
merely opened another set of contentious encounters in the run-up to the ulti-
mate show-down in Munich.5 From 1969 to 1972, the Munich Olympics and 
Brandt’s rapprochement with the East combined to keep sports functionaries 
and politicians on both sides of the German border in a permanent state of 
anxious activity.6  
It has been suggested that sport enjoyed an easier relationship with politics 
under Brandt than had hitherto been the case in the history of the Federal Re-
public.7 Certainly, the days of mutual suspicion and institutional bullying that 
characterized the CDU’s and the Grand Coalition’s treatment of the Deutscher 
                                                             
2  Turrini (2001). 
3  In 1961 there were 738 cross-border contests. This number dropped to 52 in 1966, 48 in 
1967, and 32 in 1968. At the same time, the last two Olympics at which a united German 
team participated (Summer Games in Tokyo 1964 and the Winter Games in Grenoble 1968) 
required 60 play-off competitions between the FRG and the GDR. Blasius (2001); Peiffer 
(2002.) 
4  Excellent overviews are offered on this topic by, amongst others, Balbier (2004), Blasius 
(2001), Geyer (1996), Kilian (2001), Krebs (1999). 
5  For a general overview of the Munich Games, see Young (2006). 
6  For a full account, see Schiller and Young (forthcoming). 
7  Blasius (2001, pp. 307f.). 
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Sport Bund (DSB), its teams, and representatives were over. But the GDR’s 
campaign to erode the cultural-political capital of the Munich event meant that 
Bonn continued to pay close attention to its own sporting representatives’ in-
teractions in the international sphere. Such caution was understandable, as the 
onset of Ostpolitik and the public relations effort necessitated by the hosting of 
an Olympic Games involved the latter in increased international contact, not 
least with the East. In the GDR too, the unfolding of these two processes – the 
sporting and the political – over several years gave the SED leadership much to 
consider. The FRG, it was feared, would use the Munich Games to ‘veil its 
aggressive, imperialistic and revanchist aims’,8 push its claim for Alleinvertre-
tung to mediate against the growing international authority of the GDR, and 
increase its influence in international federations in order to underpin its “impe-
rialism” with sporting achievements. At the same time, Ostpolitik, which in-
volved direct deals with Poland and Czechoslovakia in addition to the USSR 
and the GDR, would be handing it a tool with which to drive a wedge between 
the GDR and its Warsaw Pact allies and thus undermine Eastern Block solidar-
ity. 
Ostpolitik, of course, had indeed shuffled the pack in East German politics.9 
Not only did it encourage Moscow to play double bluff with its satellite states, 
but drew the GDR hierarchy into duplicitous games of poker with the Soviet 
leadership. For Ulbricht, who still harboured hopes of a united socialist Ger-
many, and Honecker, who viewed increased contact with the West as the Tro-
jan horse that would bring the GDR down, the stakes were raised to political 
survival. Both men had a great interest in sport: the former, a gymnast in his 
youth, was a declared fanatic, the latter – following custom in the GDR – held 
sport within his remit. Both had starkly differing views of what should happen 
in sport.  
This became apparent on Christmas Day 1970, when Ulbricht hosted the 
country’s leading sports functionaries (minus Honecker) at his home. Over 
Frau Ulbricht’s coffee and cake, the First Secretary sought to persuade his 
guests of the need for a more flexible political and indeed sports-political ap-
proach in the new climate.10 The view of the GDR’s sports history that Ulbricht 
expressed that day, whilst not inaccurate in its broad outline, would certainly 
have been too gesamtdeutsch in its premise to harmonize with the burgeoning 
Honecker-Brezhnev axis. East Germany’s international sporting success, thus 
Ulbricht, should be portrayed as a natural consequence of the GDR’s policy 
after 1945 of simply pushing along the grain of established German traditions: 
                                                             
8  Thus read many statements from the period issuing from the GDR. 
9  Of the many books on Ostpolitik, the followed were particularly helpful: Kaiser (1997), 
Potthoff (2002), Sarotte (2001). 
10  Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv Berlin 
(henceforth SAPMO) DY 30/IVA2/18/-11: Zusammenfassung über ein Gespräch mit Ge-
nossen Walter Ulbricht am 25. Dezember 1970 in Oberhof, 5 January 1971. 
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“im Grunde genommen wurde eine Vereinigung der Arbeitersportbewegung 
mit der bürgerlichen deutschen Turn- und Sportbewegung vorgenommen.” 
Sport, Ulbricht argued, was another fine example of the GDR’s truth claim to 
German nationhood; for him it was clear that “der sozialistische deutsche Na-
tionalstaat unter den Bedingungen des entwickelten gesellschaftlichen Systems 
die Interessen der deutschen Nation vertritt, während die BRD diese Tradi-
tionen über Bord geworfen hat.” Ulbricht’s concrete suggestions for Munich 
were also diametrically opposed to those already taking shape under 
Honecker’s guidance. Whilst the First Secretary proposed: “[d]er sozialistische 
Sportler der DDR muß im Ausland als deutscher Humanist erkannt werden, der 
seinen sozialistischen deutschen Nationalstaat würdig vertritt”, his deputy’s 
team had appealed to the allies to take part in the cultural festival “nicht vor-
wiegend mit Werken des humanistisch-demokratischen Kulturerbes, sondern 
vor allem mit Beiträgen der sozialistischen Kunst und Kultur”.11 Whilst the 
former wanted the country’s athletes to take the trouble to visit “die Stätten 
deutscher Nationalkultur” and treat Munich “wie jede andere ausländische 
Großstadt”, the latter had even declined an invitation for East German former 
gold-medallists to join their Western counterparts in attending the Games as 
guests of honour.12 
But it was not long until Brezhnev had decided to take Honecker to the ne-
gotiating table with him, and Ulbricht was removed from power. However, that 
is not to say that the new First Secretary would have it all his own way when it 
came to Munich. As with the course of the political negotiations themselves, 
there were many twists still to come, with Moscow distancing itself and inter-
vening at turns as best fitted its overall strategy at any given moment. Such 
strategic decisions often concerned the mood of the satellite states, which in 
general were beginning to weary of their East German comrades’ entrenched 
and censuring attitude to the Federal Republic.13 The remainder of this article 
will exemplify the varied and shifting influences that came to bear on sports 
events at this particular juncture in the Cold War by focusing on one particu-
larly high-profile instance: the Olympic torch relay at the Games of 1972.14 
Here eastern-block duplicity and discontent, Soviet power-games, the East 
German ‘anti-fascist imagination’ and West German economic might form the 
weave of  a story in which ultimately the power of sport plays more than a de-
cisive role in influencing and undoing political machinations. 
                                                             
11  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/2.028/-38: Bericht über den Besuch einer Arbeitsgruppe des Minis-
teriums für Kultur beim Kulturministerium der UdSSR zur Durchführung konsultativer 
Gespräche in Vorbereitung der Olympischen Sommerspiele 1972 in München und Kiel, 23 
February 1970. 
12  SAPMO 02/IVA2/18/10: R. Hellmann to E. Honecker, 10 December 1970. 
13  See Schiller and Young (forthcoming). 
14  A preliminary account of the Torch Relay is given by Staadt (1994). 
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2. The 1972 Olympic Torch Relay 
Three Warsaw Pact countries – Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria – had little to 
gain directly from their allies’ negotiations with the FRG, but equally did not 
wish to be left in the political and economic cold. For this purpose, they were 
prepared to lose some credit with the GDR, gambling probably that their indi-
vidual moves might fall into an appropriate cycle of Moscow’s oscillating 
policy towards its most awkward protégé. Historically, their relationship with 
the GDR had been unremarkable compared to that of Poland and Czechoslova-
kia, but, paradoxically, in terms of the Munich Olympics, it was to prove most 
uneven. The major bone of contention was the route of the torch relay. During 
the course of 1970, the socialist countries had reached agreement on participa-
tion in the culture and youth programmes of the Games relatively easily,15 but 
these events affected only a tiny proportion of the respective populations that 
were permitted to travel to Munich. Domestically, the passing of the flame 
through socialist territory represented both a larger political risk if accepted and 
a potential for massive popular disappointment if denied. Poland and Czecho-
slovakia joined the GDR and the USSR in refusing the OK’s invitation, the 
latter two feigning initial interest before spinning out their ultimate replies for 
almost a year in a deliberate plan both to create maximum organizational dis-
ruption and dangle a carrot for West German support for Moscow’s for the 
1976 Games.16 However, at a meeting of brother parties in Moscow in Decem-
ber 1970 (a meeting, incidentally, of which Ulbricht had been unaware on 
Christmas Day), it was decided that the socialist countries should abstain from 
hosting the relay and argue that it should follow the shortest route from Olym-
pia to Munich. This decision, confirmed immediately afterwards at the socialist 
countries’ sports conference in Varna,17 contained two major flaws. The first 
was that the notion of the shortest route had been vague and therefore open to 
redefinition.18 The second was that Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria had al-
                                                             
15  For further details, see Schiller and Young (forthcoming). 
16  Carl und Liselott Diem Archiv, Olympic Research Institute of the German Sport University 
Cologne (henceforth CULDA), XX. Olympische Spiele München 1972, 3.1: Letter from W. 
Daume to H. Schöbel, betr.: Olympischer Fackellauf 1972, 27 October 1969. SAPMO DY 
30/IVA2/2.028/-35: Aktennotiz – Weg der olympischen Flamme 1972, 15 December 1969. 
CULDA, XX. Olympische Spiele München 1972, 3.1: Letter from W. Daume to K. Andria-
nov, 9 March 1970. Ibid.: Letter from W. Daume to K. Andrianov, 10 July 1970. Ibid.: 
Übersetzung des Briefes von K. Andrianov vom 31.7.1970. Ibid.: Letter from H. Schöbel to 
W. Daume, 1 August 1970. 
17  SAPMO, 02/IV/10.02/19: Information über die gegenwärtige Haltung einiger sozialisti-
scher Länder zum Fackellauf anläßlich der Olympischen Spiele 1972 in München, 3 Febru-
ary 1971. 
18  At a meeting in the GDR embassy in Budapest on 27 January 1971, for instance, the Hun-
garians pointed out: “Während der Beratung in Varna im Dezember 1971 sei angeblich 
nicht exakt gesagt worden, was unter dem ‘kürzesten Weg’ zu verstehen sei. Die Meinung 
der VRU ist dazu: der kürzeste Weg sei per Flugzeug oder über Jugoslawien und Österreich 
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ready broken ranks and given their consent to the OK the previous spring.19 In 
Moscow, however, only the traditionally recalcitrant Rumanians chose to point 
this out. 
Whereas Rumania had let the side down badly before, most notably by es-
tablishing diplomatic relations with the FRG in 1967, Hungary and Bulgaria 
obviously found themselves in a predicament in Moscow. When the GDR had 
paid them a visit earlier in the year, it had found them, unlike the Rumanians,20 
largely co-operative. The Bulgarians had agreed with their guests’ arguments, 
requested further consultations and proved their pedigree by refusing an all-
expenses paid trip to the Kieler Woche to inspect the site of the Olympic re-
gatta.21 In Hungary too there was a detectable will within the Foreign Ministry 
to follow the East Germans’ general line.22 Both countries, however, had inti-
mated that they might take part in the relay. As well as citing the domino effect 
of the other’s possible participation, each put forward reasons of their own. The 
Bulgarian Foreign Ministry informed the GDR ambassador that it would like to 
host the relay should Moscow win the Games of 1976, and feared – somewhat 
spuriously – that refusal to do so in 1972 would disqualify it on the later occa-
sion.23 Arpad Csanadi (Deputy Chair of the Hungarian Association for Kör-
perkultur und Sport) argued that hosting the flame would prove socialism’s 
nurturing of the Olympic ideal and could be used simultaneously to influence 
the Hungarian population directly in the Olympic cause.24 The East Germans 
                                                                                                                                
nach der BRD! Das würde jedoch nicht der Unterstützung der olympischen Idee entspre-
chen. Deshalb werde in Erwägung gezogen, die Flamme auch über einen kleinen Abschnitt 
des Territoriums der VR Ungarn zu führen.” (SAPMO, 02/IV/10.02/19: Information über 
die gegenwärtige Haltung einiger sozialistischer Länder zum Fackellauf anlässlich der 
Olympischen Spiele 1972 in München, 3 February 1971.) 
19  CULDA, XX. Olympische Spiele München 1972, 3.1: Letters  and telegrams to W. Daume 
in April  and May 1970, re. acceptance of participation in the torch relay: Luxembourg (13 
April), France (14 April), Switzerland (13 April), Italy (8 April), Austria (14 April), Yugo-
slavia (15 April), Rumania (20 May), Bulgaria (16 April). 
20  The East Germans’ limited contact with the Rumanians over Olympic issues bear this out. 
See: SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-17: Vermerk über eine Konsultation mit dem Ministe-
rium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der SRR im Zusammenhang mit der Vorbereitung 
und Durchführung der Olympischen Spiele 1972, 22 July 1970. SAPMO DY 
30/IVA2/10.02/-18: Auszug aus einem Inf.-Bericht der Botschaft Bukarest vom 5.1., 18 
January 1971. 
21  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-17: Vermerk über Konsultationen im MfAA der VRB, 23 
March 1970. SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-17: Auszug aus einem Vermerk über ein Pres-
segespräch des Beauftragten des MfAA der Regierung der DDR für die Olympischen Spie-
le, Botschafter Böttger, am 21.3.1970 in Sofia (no date). 
22  Nonetheless the Deputy Chair of the Hungarian Association for Körperkultur und Sport, 
Arpad Csanadi, was judged to be clearly underestimating the danger of West German impe-
rialism. SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-17: AG 72 – Vermerk über Konsultationen im Minis-
terium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der UVR, 3 June 1970. 
23  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-17: AG 72 – Kurzinformation to Wildberger, ZK der SED,  
5 May 1970. 
24  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-17: AG 72 – Vermerk über Konsultationen im Ministerium 
für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der UVR, 3 June 1970. 
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were unimpressed with both positions, and took up the Hungarians’ invitation 
to prove that the West Germans were intending to misuse the flame for political 
purposes. Put on the spot, they convinced them that the organizers were plan-
ning to split the torch before it reached Munich and send it across the GDR to 
Berlin.  
It was apparent, however, that the need for a watertight argument about the 
flame had become acute and its conceptualization was put on the agenda of the 
next meeting of the GDR’s special Olympic commission.25 By the time of the 
Moscow meeting in December 1970, the GDR had a two-pronged argumenta-
tion in place.26 First, it pressed the emotive issue of West Berlin, arguing that 
the organizers had informed them that should they wish to bring the torch to 
East Berlin, it would have to traverse the western part of the city as well.27 
Second, it posited – contrafactually, given that the relay was actually inaugu-
rated in 1936 – that the organizers of the Berlin Games had contravened the 
Olympic tradition observed by all subsequent host cities and invented “der 
‘lange’ Fackellauf”, which had provocatively and unnecessarily crossed 
Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Austria and Czechoslovakia in a route of over 
3075 kilometres. Although in Moscow, the GDR persuaded its allies – superfi-
cially, at least – that the flame should travel as directly as possible from Greece 
to Germany with the aid of motorized transport, either by plane (for which it 
cited the examples of 1952, 1956, 1964) or by ship via Italy, Switzerland or 
Austria (as in 1960 or 1968),28 neither of its arguments stood up to the facts of 
Olympic history or the Munich organizers’ planned itinerary. In point of fact, 
Berlin 1936 represented one of the most direct routes in Olympic history. An 
alternative path following a strict crow line, would merely have swapped Alba-
nia for Bulgaria.  
Subsequent Games might have benefited from the assistance of transport, 
but they were nearly always much more extravagant in their psycho-geographi-
                                                             
25  For details of the formation of this committee, see Schiller and Young (forthcoming). 
26  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/2.021/-124: ZK der SED, Büro Mittag – Was beabsichtigen die 
herrschenden Kreise der Bundesrepublik und die Organisatoren der Olympischen Spiele in 
München 1972 mit dem Fackellauf?, 5 February 1971. SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-17: 
Without title, speech on the torch relay (1971, no exact date). 
27  The GDR had not in fact been contacted by the FRG about Berlin. However, it is unclear 
whether they had invented a plausible scenario or were acting on recent intelligence infor-
mation derived from the West German Foreign Office. A letter from early 1971 shows that 
although Berlin had been definitely ruled out of consideration before the Soviet Block’s 
meeting in Moscow, it had nonetheless been in discussion: “Das Auswärtige Amt war von 
Anfang an gegen die geplante lange Strecke. Für den Fall, daß der Lauf durch die DDR ge-
hen und dabei Ostberlin berührt werden sollte, hatte es lediglich vorsorglich darauf hinge-
wiesen, daß dann auch Westberlin zu beteiligen sei. Durch den erwähnten Beschluss des 
Fackellaufausschusses vom 2. November 1970 ist das Problem Berlin hinfällig geworden” 
(Source, Archiv des Instituts für Sportwissenschaft, Universität Hannover, Handakten Mar-
tius: Letter from Martius to the Foreign Minister, 23 February 1971.) 
28  SAPMO 02/IVA2/2.028/35: Letter from A. Norden to E. Honecker, 4 February 1971. 
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cal projections.29 In 1952, for instance, the flame had stopped in both Munich 
and Düsseldorf, where it was honoured on the tarmac by speeches from the 
cities’ respective mayors before flying to Aalborg, whence it skirted the north-
ern Danish and western Swedish coast to Copenhagen, Malmo and Gothenburg 
before zigzagging, partly in a special-terrain vehicle, across and up the east 
coast to its apex with Finland. There it was conjoined at Tornio with a flame lit 
above the Artic Circle in Pallastunturi from beams of the midnight sun, before 
tracing its way south again to Helsinki. In the case of Rome 1960, too, the ship 
from Greece disembarked its symbolic cargo in Syracuse, allowing for a long 
route through the south of Italy. The torch’s further-flung destinations merely 
provided increased scope for the celebratory imagination. On its way to Mel-
bourne in 1956, it stopped off in four countries (Calcutta, Bangkok, Singapore 
and Djakarta) before beginning its long Australian trek from Darwin. Not to be 
outdone, the Tokyo organizers of 1964 took the torch on tour to Istanbul, Bei-
rut, Teheran, Lahore, New Delhi, Calcutta, Rangoon, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, 
Manila, Hongkong and Taipeh before splitting it in four to send it through all 
regions of Japan. The most recent Games, in Mexico City four years later, had 
been no less expansive in their quest to trace out the advent of European culture 
to the New World. Combining the routes of Christopher Columbus and famous 
Spanish sailors, the Mexicans brought the flame to Genoa (Columbus’s birth-
place) and Barcelona (the site of his homecoming) and, after a relay through 
Spain concluded by a descendent of Columbus, proceeded along the explorer’s 
route to the Canary Islands and San Salvador in the Bahamas, where relays 
were also held. It then followed the path of conquistador Hernando Cortés, via 
Veracruz to Tenochtitlan (the forerunner of the Mexican capital) in whose 
environs it merged with Aztec culture by lighting a flame dish on the Pyramid 
of the Moon. 
Initially, the Munich organizers’ retained the option of a grand scheme. One 
early sketch outlined the possibility of a relay covering 27,000 kilometres (only 
4000 of which by plane), lasting 110-120 days at an estimated cost of DM 3.5 
million.30 There were also suggestions – which fused the memory of Mexico 
(where the torch merged with Aztec culture on the Pyramid of the Moon in 
Tenochtitlan) with an aspiration to the technological cutting edge – of letting 
                                                             
29  The following facts are taken from Borgers (1996).   
30  CULDA, XX. Olympische Spiele München 1972, IV.2: Vorlage zur 17. Vorstandssitzung 
des Organisationskomitees am 21./22. November 1969. (The matter, however, was not dealt 
with at this session). The proposed route was: Olympia – Athens – Sofia – Bucharest – Bel-
grade – Budapest – Vienna – Linz – Innsbruck- Milan – Florence – Rome – Naples – 
Messina – Palermo – Tunis (ship) Algiers – Oran – Casablanca – Tangiers (ship) Algeciras 
– Lisbon – Madrid – Barcelona – Montpellier – Marseille – Lyon – Paris – Brussels – Rot-
terdam (ship) Dover – London – Birmingham – Manchester – Harwich (ship) Amsterdam – 
Bremen – Flensburg – Fredericia (ship) Nyborg – Korsör (ship) Copenhagen. From there by 
plane to: Oslo – Stockholm – Helsinki – Leningrad – Moscow – Minsk – Warsaw. Then run 
again: Prague – Leipzig – Frankfurt/M. – Augsburg – Zurich – Munich. 
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the flame orbit the earth in a satellite.31 But these were soon reduced to nar-
rower, albeit still ambitious dimensions.  
The idea of going to Africa was floated, but after initial enthusiasm on both 
sides, gently dropped. In March 1970, the relay working party, in full aware-
ness of the event’s “political character” and buoyed by the initial interest of the 
Soviets and East Germans, planned a 6,022 kilometre run through Greece, 
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, touching the USSR, Poland and Czechoslova-
kia before entering Hungary, Austria, northern Italy, Switzerland, and skirting 
eastern France before its descent to Munich.32 The decision by the USSR and 
the GDR to protract their withdrawal over this period and later to argue for the 
shortest route was undermined, however, by an unforeseen and unrelated inter-
vention. In mid 1970, Turkey asked for Istanbul to be included, thus shifting 
the centre of gravity definitively to the East with obvious practical conse-
quences for the definition of the ‘shortest route’.33 Soon the President of the 
1972 Organizing Committee, Willi Daume, could argue in the face of Eastern 
block criticism – almost with impunity – that some socialist countries lay on 
the direct path.34 Vitally, there was never any real plan to take the torch to 
Berlin. In 1967, a very early draft had contrasted two options, a ‘shortest route’ 
(2925 kilometres via Vienna, Passau) and one with an additional loop via Pra-
gue, East Berlin and Leipzig.35 The thinking behind this was still just in keep-
ing with West German foreign policy and practice and reflected the long-term 
German vision of IOC President Avery Brundage:36 “Die Einbeziehung der 
DDR in den Fackel-Staffellauf könnte den Gedanken und das Bewußtsein eines 
                                                             
31  Dr. Kai Braak, an advisor to the OC, suggested that the flame “in einer Raumkapsel die 
Erde umkreist, bevor sie in München für die Zeit der Spiele festgehalten wird. Ein Flug um 
die Erde ist ja auch einfacher zu realisieren (z.B. mit einem Passagierflugzeug). Wichtig ist 
bei beiden Vorschlägen, dass der Staffellauf, der Olympia möglichst direkt mit München 
verbände, aufgegeben oder doch stark reduziert wird zugunsten der Durchdringen des tech-
nischen Fortschritts (Raumfahrt) mit dem olympischen Gedanken. Es wäre gut, wenn vor 
der ersten Atombombe die Flamme des Friedens im Weltall herumflöge. Das wäre eine 
Gemeinschaftsaufgabe für die Atommächte, die nützlich und in ihrer psychologischen Wir-
kung vielleicht nicht zu unterschätzen ist”. (CULDA, XX. Olympische Spiele München 
1972, 3.3: Einige Gedanken über Eröffnungs- und Schlussfeier bei den Olympischen Spie-
len 1972 in München von Dr. Kai Braak, Oberspielleiter am Staatstheater in Kassel, 23/ 27 
February 1968.) 
32  CULDA, XX. Olympische Spiele München 1972, 3.1: 1. Sitzung Ausschuß-Fackellauf,  
2 March 1970. 
33  CULDA, XX. Olympische Spiele München 1972, 3.1: 2. Sitzung Ausschuß-Fackellauf,  
15 June 1970. The notion of the direct route seems to have been approximate rather than 
strictly geometrical. 
34  This was: Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Austria. (Source: 
CULDA, XX. Olympische Spiele München 1972, 3.1: 3. Sitzung Ausschuss-Fackellauf,  
2 November 1970). Although this is the route eventually followed, the actual direct route 
from Istanbul would have been: Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Austria, Federal Republic. 
35  CULDA, XX. Olympische Spiele München 1972, 3.1: Vorschlag und Entwurf für den 
Olympia-Fackelstaffellauf 1972, 18 July 1967. 
36  On Brundage, see the seminal biography by Guttmann (1983). 
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geeinten Deutschlands nur vertiefen. Die Olympische Idee würde hier – unter 
Berücksichtigung des besonders gelagerten deutschen Verhältnisses – eine 
weitere Erfüllung finden.” But when planning began in earnest in 1969, Berlin 
never seriously entered the agenda,37 and attention turned more to gaining 
maximum exposure for the flame along the Alpine holiday routes in the 
south.38 In mid 1970, the Auswärtige Amt advised that East Berlin would cause 
political problems and Daume wrote to the IOC with three options relating to 
the GDR, none of which included the city.39 
Hungary and Bulgaria might have been embarrassed into silence in Mos-
cow, but the GDR’s well-laid plans began unravelling just weeks later at a 
meeting of relay host countries called by the Munich organizers in January 
1971. This was attended by NOC members from each of the participating na-
tions, except Bulgaria, which had sent a telegram ten days earlier withdrawing 
altogether due “to unforeseen circumstances”.40 Daume announced that the 
organizers had been the victims of a GDR smear campaign, and the partici-
pants, including the Hungarian representative,41 demanded a letter be written to 
the Bulgarians expressing their consternation at the politicization of a neutral 
event. With the GDR’s strategy exposed by telegrams and international press 
releases,42 Hungary and Bulgaria were left with a high-profile and difficult 
decision to make. The Hungarians, who had not actually withdrawn but simply 
withheld their final acceptance,43 found themselves in the easier position. A 
joint paper put forward by the Central Committee and the Hungarian sports 
association, which located Hungary as an integral part of the shortest route, was 
                                                             
37  The first working party meeting mentioned Berlin as a problem, but significantly did not 
include it on any of the routes it discussed. (Source: CULDA, XX. Olympische Spiele 
München 1972, 3.1: 1. Sitzung Ausschuss-Fackellauf, 2 March 1970.) 
38  CULDA, XX. Olympische Spiele München 1972, IV.2: 19. Vorstandssitzung des Organisa-
tionskomitees, 17 April 1970. 
39  CULDA, XX. Olympische Spiele München 1972, 3.1: 2. Sitzung Ausschuß-Fackellauf, 15 
June 1970. The suggestions were: 1. Munich to Kiel through the GDR; 2. Olympia to Mu-
nich via GDR; 3. Dividing the torch at Kassel, with one going north to Kiel via Magdeburg, 
Rostock, Wismar, one going south via Erfurt and Leipzig.  
40 Deutsches Olympisches Institut Berlin (now Frankfurt/M.) (henceforth DOI), Daume Nach-
laß 600: Telegram from V. Stoytchev to W. Daume, 6 January 1970: “Badauere dass un-
vorhersehbare Umstände das BOK verhindern den Olympischen Feuerstaffellauf durch bul-
garisches Territorium zu organisieren [sic].” 
41  This was Biró, because Arpad Csanadi was involved in a consultation with the three IOC 
Vice Presidents on questions of amateur status. 
42  DOI, Daume Nachlaß 600: Telegram from W. Daume to V. Stoytchev, 11 January 1971. 
SAPMO DY 30/IVB2/18/-27: APP report – Brundage: Olympische Flamme nicht nach 
Westberlin, 20 January 1970. DOI, Daume Nachlass 600: Letter from Daume to Martinsky, 
18 February 1971. 
43  Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Berlin (henceforth PAAA), B42 / 1338: Betr.: 
Besuch des bulgarischen Außenhandelsministers Abramow; hier: Olympische Spiele Mün-
chen 1972, 10 February 1971. 
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discussed in the Politbüro in March 1971.44 Thus, using one prong of the 
GDR’s argument to undermine the other, a path was cleared to confirm their 
participation to the Munich organizers.45 A month later, the Hungarians put up 
their own smoke screen, giving the GDR conflicting information about the state 
of their deliberations.46  
This will have been of little surprise to the East Germans. At their initial 
consultation the year before, they had noted a split in the degree of cooperation 
they might expect from the helpful Foreign Ministry on the one hand and the 
politically less supine sports department on the other. 47 Moreover, they had 
discovered that sport in Hungary enjoyed a semi-autonomous position that was 
reasonably protected from excessive government intervention. The reason for 
this relative freedom was the regime’s recognition of sport’s vital role in mod-
ern Hungarian identity, which boasted the world’s best football team of the 
1950s and a fine Olympic record.48 The general decline in Hungarian sport in 
the early 1960s had provoked widespread discussion amongst the population 
and political circles alike, with the so-called “period of stagnation” being 
brought to an end with the dissolution ot the state sports apparatus and its re-
constitution on a communal basis.49 The new system had proved hugely suc-
cessful, Hungary coming third in the medal chart at the Mexico Games, and 
earning special mention at the beginning of the Official Film. Preparation for 
Munich was no less intense. With the agreement of the party, the Association 
for Körperkultur und Sport had launched a highly successful global initiative 
with the World Association of Hungarians to raise money via lotteries and 
prize draws to cover the costs of sending its delegation to the Games. Benefac-
tors from all political hues were expected to make the journey to Munich or 
take up their prize trips back to the homeland. In Hungary, therefore, sport’s 
leading cultural role reduced its pliability to outside sources, and as the Games 
approached, the GDR became increasingly disenchanted with its ally’s stance 
on Munich. Critical comments in the Hungarian press were passed on merely 
                                                             
44  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-18: AG 72 – Information über eine Mitteilung der Botschaft 
der DDR in Budapest vom 10.3.1971, 10 March 1971. 
45  CULDA, XX. Olympische Spiele München 1972, 3.1: Letter from S. Beckl, President of 
the Hungarian NOC, to W. Daume, 23 April 1971. 
46  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.07/-18: Information für das Sekretariat des Zentralkomitees – 
Information über den Aufenthalt einer Delegation des Zentralkomitees der Ungarischen 
Sozialistischen Arbeiterpartei zum Studium der Erfahrungen der SED auf dem Gebiet der 
Sportpolitik, 3 May 1971. SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-18: DTSB – Information, 12 May 
1971. SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-18: Botschaft der DDT in der UVR – Notiz über ein 
Gespräch des Genossen Prof. Norden mit dem Mitglied des Politbüros des ZK der USAP 
Genosse Komócsin am 14.5.1971, 14 May 1971.  
47  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-17: AG 72 – Vermerk über Konsultationen im Ministerium 
für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der UVR, 3 June 1970. 
48  See, for instance, Kasza (2004, 2006). 
49  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-18: Information über die Vorbereitung der Ungarischen 
Volksrepublik auf die Olympischen Sommerspiele 1972 in München (Übersetzung aus dem 
Slowakischen), 7 April 1971. 
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as reports from other Eastern block countries and gradually faded into the 
background.50 The chief of publicity for the 1972 Games, Hans Klein, was 
treated leniently when he made his official publicity visit, and the public rev-
elled in their journalists’ enthusiasm for the Games’ organisation and infra-
structure.51 In March 1972, the Hungarian football team played the FRG in 
front of 50,000 supporters in Budapest, and the event – as reported with resig-
nation by an East German source – had turned into the “massenwirksamste 
Ereignis”.52 
If the shape of the residual documentation provides an accurate reflection of 
events, then it is clear that the GDR focussed its efforts on Bulgaria rather than 
Hungary.53 Tactically, removing one piece in the geographical jigsaw would 
cause sufficient organisational havoc. Additionally, diplomatic structures dic-
tated that the East Germans stood a better chance of unhinging Bulgarian rather 
than Hungarian co-operation with the Munich organizers. Of all the Soviet 
satellites, Bulgaria enjoyed the most uncomplicated relation with Moscow.54 In 
the 1960s the influence of the USSR had grown to such an extent that Bulgaria 
could scarcely be conceived of as an independent state.55 On the occasion of the 
twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations of the foundation of the Republic, for 
instance, an observer in the West German Trade Mission noted that the Soviet 
State President, N. Podgorny, was “in einer Form hofiert […] und selbst so 
auftrat, als mache das Staatsoberhaupt einer Großmacht einen Besuch in einer 
seiner Provinzhauptstädte.” Politically, the potential thaw of doctrinal Stalinism 
and opening to the West of the mid 1960s had begun to freeze over again in 
1967 and had hardened in particular after the Prague Spring. Any burgeoning 
flirtation with the Czech model was quashed: unruly youths were dealt with 
harshly and agitation about Western subversion and ideological diversion went 
into overdrive. Soviet bookshops abounded and the media merely filtered the 
output of their Soviet counterparts into Bulgarian.  
                                                             
50  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-18: Botschaft der DDR in der UVR – Bemerkungen zur 
Darstellung des Sports in der DDR und zur Behandlung der Olympischen Spiele in Mün-
chen in den Massenmedien, 8 August 1971. 
51  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-18: AG 72 – Information über eine telegraphische Mitteilung 
unserer Botschaft in Budapest vom 15.6.1971, 16 June 1971. 
52  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-18: Auszug aus Information der Botschaft Budapest vom 
25.5.1972 über die kulturellen Beziehungen UVR – BRD 1972 (no date). 
53  This notwithstanding an East German strategic suggestion at the beginning of February 
1971 that it might be worth concentrating on Hungary. (SAPMO, 02/IV/10.02/19: Informa-
tion über die gegenwärtige Haltung einiger sozialistischer Länder zum Fackellauf anlässlich 
der Olympischen Spiele 1972 in München, 3 February 1971.) 
54  Sources: PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1337: Handelsvertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland to 
the Auswärtiges Amt, betr.: 25. Jahrestag der Volksrepublik Bulgarian, 12 September 1969. 
PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1337: Handelsvertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Sofia to the 
Auswärtiges Amt, betr.: Fünf Jahre Handelsvertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in 
Sofia, 29 August 1969. 
55  See Crampton (1997, p. 199) and Bell (1991, pp. 187-188). 
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In foreign policy terms, Bulgaria operated as the “verlängerter Arm Mos-
kaus”, sending aid and technical expertise it could ill afford to third world 
countries when it suited the Soviet Union to maintain a low profile. Accord-
ingly, relations with other countries mirrored those of Moscow. Yugoslavia and 
Rumania, for instance, were treated coolly, the GDR, by contrast, with consid-
erable warmth. Since the completion of the Friendship Pact, the influence of 
East Berlin had, in the view of the FRG, “increased alarmingly”. Hemmed in 
on both flanks by the Soviets and the East Germans, the FRG enjoyed virtually 
no room for political or cultural manoeuvre. Despite the Bulgarians’ genuine 
affection for the German people, the West German Trade Mission had found 
itself, both diplomatically and socially, held at arm’s length. It had found it 
impossible to get beyond ministerial doorkeepers, whilst the population had 
been confused and intimidated by countless show trials of alleged spies and 
reports of intense Western subterfuge. For nearly a year, Ostpolitik altered 
nothing. After a brief ceasefire in the wake of the Bundestag election, the Bul-
garian press returned to its usual form of attack,56 targeting the West Germany 
military and “expansionist” economy and caricaturing its ministers on televi-
sion. 57 By mid 1970, despite ministerial visits to the FRG from Warsaw, Buda-
pest, Belgrade, and Bucharest, the Bulgarians still avidly avoided the major 
political topic of the day and showed no inclination to discuss anything beyond 
economic practicalities.58 Typically, it was only after the signing of the Mos-
cow treaty in August 1970 that the FRG slipped down the list of Bulgarian 
propaganda targets.59  
                                                             
56  In September 1969, for instance, at Bulgaria’s twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations, the 
Russians whipped up a storm with reports of militaristic-revanchist powers in the FRG and 
vaguely defined “aggressive circles” that intended to make the Balkans the “powder keg” of 
Europe again. The head of the East German delegation, Herrmann Matern, was even more 
vitriolic in his attack on the FRG, but thanked the Bulgarians for their vital support. (Sour-
ce: PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1337: Handelsvertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland to the 
Auswärtiges Amt, betr.: 25. Jahrestag der Volksrepublik Bulgarian, 12 September 1969.) A 
month later, an article from the Polish press re. revanchism had re-appeared in the Bulgar-
ian army publication “Narodna Anmija”, a general symptom of what the FRG interpreted as 
the Bulgarian press’s “nie erlahmende[] Lust zur Hetze gegen die Bundesrepublik”. (Sour-
ce: PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1337: Handelsvertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Sofia to 
the Auswärtiges Amt, betr.: Bulgarische Presseveröffentlichungen gegen die Olympische 
Spiele in München, 17 October 1969.) 
57  PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1337: Handelsvertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Sofia to the 
Auswärtiges Amt, betr. Bulgarische Presse über die Bundesrepublik, 2 February 1970. 
58  PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1337: Handelsvertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Sofia to the 
Auswärtiges Amt, betr.: Eindrücke nach viermonatiger Tätigkeit in Sofia, 25 June 1970. 
59  On the National Holiday on the anniversary of the Bulgarian Revolution on 8 September 
1970, for instance, the polemical sharpness had disappeared from the main speech, deliv-
ered by the Interior Trade Minister, Peko Takow. The FRG was mentioned only in connec-
tion with the completion of the Moscow Treaty. Emphasizing Moscow’s role in spreading 
socialist peace, Takow noted: “wo Anfang des Jahrhunderts zwei verheerende Weltkonflik-
te entstanden sind, weht ein warmer Wind”. The usual anti-American barb was largely 
missing from the banners that accompanied the military parade. FRG and China, in contrast 
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From the GDR perspective, Bulgaria’s Achilles heel – in addition to its will-
ingness to sway with the wind from Moscow – was its economic vulnerability. 
Although it enjoyed more prosperity than the USSR, its standard of living 
lagged behind that of the other satellites. In 1966, the FRG had become its 
second largest exporter, and, with an exchange of goods worth DM 600 mil-
lion, the country’s fourth largest trade partner overall (behind the USSR, GDR 
and Czechoslovakia).60 One hundred Germans had lived in Jambol working on 
large-scale DMT and polyester factory projects run by the Krupp and Lurgi 
companies, and their presence had helped to correct the image of the FRG in an 
underdeveloped part of the country. On the eve of Ostpolitik, the Head of the 
West German Trade Mission deduced, prophetically as it turned out, that “han-
delspolitische Entscheidungen nicht aus tagespolitischem Geschehen getroffen 
werden dürfen, da sie in die Zukunft hineinwirken”. The softening of tone with 
regard to Ostpolitik in Sofia will have given the GDR pause for thought. Three 
weeks of discussions in Sofia in October-November 1970 had led to the formu-
lation of a long-term trade agreement between Bulgaria and the FRG. This 
concrete progress had been accompanied by a plethora of positive statements in 
the Bulgarian press on Ostpolitik in general and the possibility of close ties 
between the two countries. Previous hard-line statements about the strict multi-
lateral conditions under which diplomatic relations could be resumed had been 
modified to the point where it was publicly intimated that nothing stood in the 
way of bilateral recognition.  
Between the socialist countries’ Olympics meeting in Moscow in December 
1970 and the Bulgarian’s withdrawal from the relay in early January 1971, 
Willi Stoph, the Chair of the GDR’s Ministerrat, arrived in Sofia without prior 
announcement for an unofficial visit on 19 December.61 After discussions with 
Todor Schiwkow (the head of the Bulgarian government) and Iwan Popow (the 
Chair of the Committee for Science and Technology) a treaty was signed in 
East Berlin on 21 December aimed to increase trade exchange between the two 
countries by a dramatic 83 per cent over four years running up to 1975. It was 
rumoured amongst Western sources that the Bulgarians had asked for consider-
able loans, to which the East Germans’ consent had been made conditional on 
the settling of “some unresolved issues”. Stoph’s visit, following on from 
                                                                                                                                
to previous years, escaped unabused. (Source: PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1337: Telex from Sofia 
to the Auswärtiges Amt, 11 September 1970.) 
60  PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1337: Handelsvertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Sofia to the 
Auswärtiges Amt, betr.: Fünf Jahre Handelsvertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in 
Sofia, 29 August 1969. PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1337: AA, der Leiter der Politischen Abteilung 
– Aufzeichnung dem Herrn Staatssekretär mit dem Vorschlag der Vorlage beim Herrn 
Bundesminister, betr.: Stand und Perspektiven der deutsch-bulgarischen politischen Bezie-
hungen vor dem Besuch des bulgarischen Außenhandelsministers Awramow, 2 February 
1971. 
61  PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1339: Telex from the Handelsvertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land Sofia to the Auswärtiges Amt, betr.: Besuch Willi Stophs in Bulgarien, 23 December 
1970. 
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Schiwkow’s trip to the GDR in May 1969, was interpreted by West German 
observers as an indication of an intensified desire for close co-operation on 
issues beyond the economic. Certainly, the political implications of the trip 
were underscored by an article in the party organ “Rabotnitschesko Delo”, 
which attacked the FRG’s relation with the GDR in tones that “had gone out of 
fashion” since the beginning of Ostpolitik. In the immediate aftermath of the 
Bulgarian withdrawal from the relay and amidst Daume and Brundage’s ap-
peals,62 the East Germans sought further to strengthen their allies’ loyalty with 
particular reference to the domain of sport. On 14 January, Ewald and Hell-
mann brought greetings from Honecker to high-ranking officials of the Bulgar-
ian government in Sofia and suggested an extension to their already existing 
joint project “Freundschaft” in Bulgarian Belmelken to secure high altitude 
training for their athletic programme until the year 1996.63 The Bulgarians, 
however, surprised and frustrated their guests with objections to the contract 
already in force and stipulations that the camp would revert to Bulgarian own-
ership at the end of a fixed period. 
It is not clear whether the recent revelation of the GDR’s lies about the torch 
relay played a role in the Bulgarians’ uncharacteristic reticence. The previous 
day, however, Ewald and Hellmann had been summoned by a Candidate for the 
Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (Genow) and told that 
the Bulgarians, whilst maintaining the common line agreed in Moscow, were 
worried about the undesirable affect a withdrawal might have on their hosting 
of the IOC congress in 1973.64 Congresses, as opposed to the annual – and in 
Olympic years, biennial – IOC sessions, occurred only rarely and, as well as 
the usual IOC members, consisted of representatives of the individual sports 
federations and NOCs.  The event planned for the Varna Sports Palace in 1973 
would be the first since Berlin in 1930 and was set to mark the fiftieth anniver-
sary of the Bulgarian Olympic Committee. Its IOC member Stoytchev, confi-
dent of his government’s backing of several hundred thousand dollars, had set 
about planning to receive 1000 participants.65 Towards the end of the month, 
                                                             
62  Avery Brundage Collection, University of Illinois (henceforth ABC), Box 118: Telegram 
from A. Brundage to the NOC of Bulgaria, 16 January 1971. 
63  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/18/-11: Niederschrift über eine Aussprache mit dem Mitglied des 
Politbüros und Sekretär des ZK der KP Bulgarien, Genossen Weltschew, am 14.1.1971, 19 
January 1971. 
64  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/18/-11: Abteilung Sport – Information über ein Gespräch des Genos-
sen Genow, Kandidat des ZK der Bulgarischen Kommunistischen Partei, mit Genossen 
Ewald und Hellmann am 13.1.1971 über den Fackellauf zu den Olympischen Spielen 1972 
in München, 18 January 1971. 
65  IOC Lausanne, Minutes of the Executive Board of the IOC: Dubrovnik, 23-27 October 
1969. In fact, only 307 official delegates, albeit from 81 countries, attended. Despite the 
growing unrest of the NOCs and the international federations, this was a productive confer-
ence, that although it passed no resolutions, had many healthy discussions of the major is-
sues of the day – politicization, gigantism, technical manipulation of the athletes, commer-
cialization. The hosts wanted its motto to be Sport for a world of peace, but its title became: 
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meetings took place at embassy and Deputy Foreign Minister level,66 but to the 
East Germans’ consternation, the Bulgarian Delegation would not be drawn on 
the matter. Convinced of their ally’s intention to participate, Albert Norden 
urged Honecker to consider immediate further action, such as involving the 
Soviets or sending Mittag during his forthcoming holiday in Bulgaria to visit 
Shiwkow. By this stage, however, the Bulgarians were listening to serious 
overtures again from the Federal government.  
In February 1971, the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Trade, Awramov, be-
came his government’s first representative to visit the Federal Republic since 
the Second World War, and Minister Schiller (on a reciprocal invitation to the 
Plowdiv Trade Fair) the first equivalent West German official to travel to Bul-
garia since 1966.67 The purpose of Awramov’s visit was to sign the new trade 
agreement, and whilst it is highly unlikely that the deal would have risen or 
fallen on Bulgaria’s participation in the relay, the Foreign Office had deter-
mined to use the occasion to express its disappointment and request the Minis-
ter’s intervention with his NOC.68 A keen former sportsman, Awramov was 
well known to Daume and, vitally, held the post of Vice President of the Bul-
garian NOC. The Bulgarians, however, proved deft of foot when faced with the 
awkward question and no response was forthcoming.69 In March and April, the 
                                                                                                                                
Future of the Olympic Movement and embraced three key strands: redefinition of the 
Olympic Movement and its future; relations between the IOC, international federations and 
NOCs; plans for future Olympic Games. (Sources: Höhne [1973], Müller [1980; 1994, pp. 
149-158].) 
66  SAPMO, 02/IV/10.02/19: Information über die gegenwärtige Haltung einiger sozialisti-
scher Länder zum Fackellauf anlässlich der Olympischen Spiele 1972 in München, 3 Feb-
ruary 1971. 
67  PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1337: AA, der Leiter der Politischen Abteilung – Aufzeichnung dem 
Herrn Staatssekretär mit dem Vorschlag der Vorlage beim Herrn Bundesminister, betr.: 
Stand und Perspektiven der deutsch-bulgarischen politischen Beziehungen vor dem Besuch 
des bulgarischen Außenhandelsministers Awramow, 2 February 1971. 
68  PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1338: AA, Notiz für Herrn Dr, Platz (II A 5), betr.: Absage Bulgariens 
für den olympischen Fackellauf, 20 January 1971. PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1337: AA (II A 5) – 
Aufzeichnung, betr.: Gespräch mit dem Leiter der Abteilung Westeuropa im bulgarischen 
Außenministerium, Tschernew, am 10.2.1971, 9 February 1971. PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1338: 
Betr.: Besuch des bulgarischen Außenhandelsministers Abramow; hier: Olympische Spiele 
München 1972, 10 February 1971. 
69  Whilst Brandt maintained his usual diplomatic distance on points of detail, the West Ger-
man Foreign Minister did not shirk the Olympic issue. A direct reply went missing, how-
ever, amidst the Bulgarians’ declarations of desire to increase contacts with the FRG on the 
level of ministerial, parliamentary, cultural and technical exchange and of intentions to 
found a mixed commission on the basis of the new economic agreement. In a separate dis-
cussion, Parvan Tschernew, Leader of the Abteilung Westeuropa in the Bulgarian Foreign 
Ministry was equally deft of foot. (Sources: PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1337: Rolf von Keiser, 
Handelsvertretung Sofia, z.Zt. Bonn – Vermerk über das Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers mit 
Minister Avramov am 12.2.1971, 15 February 1971; ibid.: Betr.: Gespräch des Herrn Bun-
desministers mit dem bulgarischen Außenhandelsminister Awramow am 12.2.1971 (no 
date); ibid.: Betr.: Gespräch von Herrn Dg II A mit dem Leiter der Abteilung Westeuropa 
im bulgarischen Außenministerium, Tschernew, am 10.2.1971, 16 February 1971.) 
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West Germans were still waiting. A meeting between the Munich organizers 
and the Bulgarian NOC, promised in January, did not materialize,70 and the 
Trade Mission could only report that the Bulgarian press formed a perfect 
match with Moscow’s slow grind about treaty ratification.71 In late May, how-
ever, Brundage wrote to the Bulgarian Prime Minister (Todor Givnov), encour-
aging him to remember his hosting of the forthcoming Congress,72 and Bulgar-
ian NOC President Vladimir Stoytchev attended a meeting of the relay hosts 
(as part of a conference of European NOCs in Austria), informing them that a 
decision would soon be taken.73 It looked likely that the Turkish representative 
at the conference would have to curb his enthusiasm for the flame circumvent-
ing Bulgaria on its way to Konstanza in Rumania by means of a naval de-
stroyer.  
Earlier in the month, the East Germans had seen their last hopes of disrupt-
ing the relay crumble in dramatic fashion. A Bulgarian government delegation 
had flown to East Berlin, having already informed a GDR embassy official at 
Sofia airport that they held little hope of reaching agreement with their East 
German comrades.74 Convinced that the FRG harboured no revanchist inten-
tions, they had held discussions at brother party level with Poland, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and the USSR.75  In East Berlin, which repeated the request 
that they had made in the name of their Central Committee across the Eastern 
block, to be released from their previous veto. Poland, Hungary and Czecho-
slovakia had given their consent, and the Soviets, whilst maintaining their 
original stance, decided not to interfere with Bulgaria’s decision. The Bulgari-
ans argued that the conclusion of the Treaty negotiations with the USSR and 
Poland meant that “einige Fragen realistischer eingeschätzt werden müßten”, 
and stressed the desire to normalize their own relationship with the FRG. 
                                                             
70  In April 1971, Daume wrote asking why he had not heard from the Bulgarian NOC since 
their telegram of 20 January 1971. (Source: DOI, Daume Nachlaß 586: Letter from W. 
Daume to the Bulgarian NOC, 14 April 1971). 
71  PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1337: Handelsvertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Sofia to the 
Auswärtiges Amt, betr.: Feldzug der bulgarischen Presse gegen die Sender “Radio Free Eu-
rope” und “Liberty”, 3 March 1971. PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1337: Handelsvertretung der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland Sofia to the Auswärtiges Amt, betr.: Bulgarische Presse zur 
Frage der Ratifizierung der Moskauer und Warschauer Verträge, 21 April 1971. 
72  Avery Brundage Collection, Box 118: Letter from A. Brundage to T. Givnov, Prime Minis-
ter of Bulgaria, 28 May 1971. Brundage imagined that “you will be eager to cooperate, par-
ticularly as Bulgaria will have the honor or acting as host to the first Olympic conference in 
40 [sic] years”. 
73  CULDA, XX. Olympische Spiele München 1972, 3.1: Tagung der Vertreter der Eu-
ropäischen Nationalen Olympischen Komitees in Baden bei Wien vom 6.-9. Mai 1971, 25 
May 1971. 
74  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-18: Botschaft der DDR Sofia – Notiz, betr.: Besuch der Gen. 
Genow und Martinski in Berlin am 4. und 5.5.1971, 11 May 1971. 
75  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-18: Information über ein Vorgespräch, das die Genossen Rudi 
Hellmann, Manfred Ewald und Ühlmann am 3. Mai, von 16.00 bis 18.30 Uhr mit der bul-
garischen Parteidelegation im Gästehaus des ZK der SED führen. 
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Withdrawing from the relay would be out of the question, not least because 
“man diesem Lauf keine überhöhte politische Bedeutung zusprechen könne”. 
The East Germans were incandescent with rage and vowed not stand to stand 
idly by as the “enemy” drove a north-south wedge through the socialist block. 
Just two days after the highly disgruntled Bulgarians left East Berlin,76 Man-
fred Ewald flew to Moscow under instruction from the Central Committee of 
the SED to conduct talks at the Department of Propaganda in its Soviet coun-
terpart. The GDR’s request that Moscow call a meeting of Central Committee 
representatives at the highest appropriate level to resolve the matter met with 
little enthusiasm.77 A month later, although stalling on giving an official gov-
ernment response, the Soviets reiterated the fruitlessness of shutting the stable 
door after the Hungarians and Bulgarians had so obviously bolted.78 Finally at 
the beginning of July, with the Bulgarian press commenting positively on the 
SPD’s “first half” in government and the FRG’s burgeoning relationship with 
the USSR,79 Stoytchev gave Daume the all-clear for the relay.80  
3. Conclusion 
The East Germans, despite trade deals and high diplomacy, were outdone by 
Hungary and Bulgaria.  Several factors contributed to their defeat. First – and 
not to be underestimated – was the role of sport. In Hungary, sport tended 
towards structural autonomy and was therefore relatively insulated against 
external political pressure, whilst in the figure of Vladimir Stoytchev its Bul-
garian counterpart possessed an Olympic idealist and national personality 
whose actions and convictions carried not inconsiderable weight: Stoytchev, 
like Brundage, was an avid fan of the 1936 Games and all things German when 
                                                             
76  On his return to Sofia, Genow informed the same GDR official who had accompanied him 
to the airport that, despite the East German Central Commitee’s disapproval of their action, 
the Bulgarians had been appalled at the way in which the GDR had tried to bully the dele-
gation into accepting their wishes in Berlin. The East Germans had contravened protocol by 
neglecting that Genow and his party had been representing the views of the Bulgarian party 
leadership. (Source: SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-18: Botschaft der DDR Sofia – Notiz, 
betr.: Besuch der Gen. Genow und Martinski in Berlin am 4. und 5.5.1971, 11 May 1971.)  
77  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-18: DTSB Präsident – Information über eine Besprechung in 
der Abteilung Propaganda des ZK der KPdSU am 7.5.1971, 9.30 Uhr, 11 May 1971. 
78  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/10.02/-18: Information über eine [sic] Gespräch des Genossen 
Gontscharow – Leiter des Sektors Sport im ZK der KPdSU (Abt. Propaganda) – mit Genos-
sen Rudi Hellmann – Leiter der Abt. Sport im ZK der SED, 10 June 1971. 
79  PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1337: Handelsvertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Sofia to the 
Auswärtiges Amt, betr. Bulgarischer Kommentar auf die Bundesregierung, 8 June 1971. 
80  Bundesarchiv Koblenz (henceforth BAK), B125 /1924: Telex from Keiser, Sofia, to the 
AA, 5 July 1971. DOI, Daume Nachlaß 586: Letter from Daume to Stoytchev, 7 July 1971. 
CULDA, XX. Olympische Spiele München 1972, 3.1: Generalsekretariat, Abt. IV – Ver-
merk, betr.: Besprechung mit der bulgarischen Delegation über Fragen des Olympischen 
Fackellaufes 1972 auf bulgarischem Gebiet am 3.8.1971, 3 August 1971. 
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it came to the Olympic movement.81 Either with (as he argued when confronted 
by the GDR’s investigation82) or without (as Bulgarian politicians main-
tained83) his government’s explicit support, his acceptance of Daume’s invita-
tion at the earliest opportunity in April 1970 helped cast the dye for later 
events. Whether they believed it or not, Bulgarian officials could argue, when 
political circumstances changed, that Stoytchev’s original acceptance turned 
their supposed refusal into an impossibly impolite withdrawal. Second, in the 
case of Bulgaria, lucrative contracts with a Western economy proved too allur-
ing.  
Third, Moscow, in the midst of its own blurred cultural rapprochement with 
the Federal Republic, decided to grant its satellites a freedom of choice on the 
relay issue. As a West German Foreign Office assessment of the two key links 
in the chain suggested, neither Hungary nor Bulgaria could have taken any 
significant step without Moscow’s approval.84 (Indeed in 1984, Bulgaria be-
came the first country to join the Soviet-led boycott of the Los Angeles Games, 
also cancelling a heavily publicized governmental visit to West Germany.85)  
And it is clear in the course of 1971 that the Soviets took no action to prevent 
the two southern states breaking ranks from their northern German ally. This 
assessment fits with the broader diplomatic picture at the beginning of that 
year. In January 1971, the Soviets instructed the GDR strictly to avoid blocking 
the political process with excessive demands of their own. Their ambassador 
(Falin) advised Foreign Minister Winzer that the SED should become more 
tolerant of the FRG’s non-political forms of representation, such as economic 
and cultural relations.86 Perhaps convinced of the right to hold onto concessions 
already won the previous month at the Olympic forum in Moscow, or keen to 
flex its own negotiation muscle within the Eastern block – Winzer had tried in 
vain with his Soviet counterpart Gromyko to assert the GDR’s right to strike its 
own deals with the FRG –, the East Germans had bitten into the relay issue and 
                                                             
81  For further details on Stoytchev, see Schiller and Young (forthcoming).  
82  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/18/-11: Aktennotiz über ein Telefongespräch mit dem Präsidenten 
des NOK Bulgariens, Generaloberst Stoitschev, Mitglied des IOC, am 19.1.1971 gegen 
10.30 Uhr. 
83  SAPMO DY 30/IVA2/18/-11: Abteilung Sport – Information über ein Gespräch des Genos-
sen Genow, Kandidat des ZK der Bulgarischen Kommunistischen Partei, mit Genossen 
Ewald und Hellmann am 13.1.1971 über den Fackellauf zu den Olympischen Spielen 1972 
in München, 18 January 1971. 
84  PAAA Berlin, B42 / 1337: AA, der Leiter der Politischen Abteilung – Aufzeichnung dem 
Herrn Staatssekretär mit dem Vorschlag der Vorlage beim Herrn Bundesminister, betr.: 
Stand und Perspektiven der deutsch-bulgarischen politischen Beziehungen vor dem Besuch 
des bulgarischen Außenhandelsministers Awramow, 2 February 1971. 
85  Bell (1991, p. 190). 
86  Sarotte (2001, pp. 102-103). 
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refused to drop the baton with canine obstinacy. The Soviets simply let them 
chase their tail.87 
On the organisational front, the West Germans had achieved exactly what 
the GDR had most feared when it first called for a combined diplomatic strat-
egy within the Eastern block: “eine Differenzierung im sozialistischen Staaten-
lager”.88 As the GDR set its sail on a course of strict “Abgrenzung”, its Warsaw 
past allies followed the general current of Ostpolitik, loosened their tack and, to 
differing degrees, opened up culturally to the Munich Games. The torch relay – 
precisely because the GDR had raised the stakes so high and was so obviously 
double-crossed by its allies – was its most humiliating diplomatic defeat. 
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